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Abstract
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The global financial crisis brought public guarantees to 
the forefront of the policy debate. Based on a review of 
the theoretical foundations of public guarantees, this 
paper concludes that the commonly used justifications 
for public guarantees based solely on agency frictions 
(such as adverse selection or lack of collateral) and/or 
un-internalized externalities are flawed. When risk is 
idiosyncratic, it is highly unlikely that a case for guarantees 
can be made without risk aversion. When risk aversion 
is explicitly added to the picture, public guarantees may 
be justified by the state’s natural advantage in dealing 
with collective action failures (providing public goods). 
The state can spread risk more finely across space and 
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time because it can coordinate and pool atomistic 
agents that would otherwise not organize themselves 
to solve monitoring or commitment problems. Public 
guarantees may be transitory, until financial systems 
mature, or permanent, when risk is fat-tailed. In the case 
of aggregate (non-diversifiable) risk, permanent public 
guarantees may also be justified, but in this case the state 
adds value not by spreading risk but by coordinating 
agents. In addition to greater transparency in justifying 
public guarantees, the analysis calls for exploiting the 
natural complementarities between the state and the 
markets in bearing risk.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  global  financial  crisis  has  brought  public  financial  risk-bearing  to  the  forefront.  
Governments came to the rescue of troubled financial markets and institutions through large risk-
absorption-of-last-resort (RALR) operations involving outright asset purchases, capital injections 
and  a  relaxation  of  collateral  requirements  for  liquidity  support.  Some  governments  also 
absorbed  large  losses  from  the  risk  positions  they  had  implicitly  taken  through  their 
developmental  commitments  prior  to  the  crisis.  This  was  the  case  in  particular  of  the  US 
government, which saw itself in the obligation to absorb the losses of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, the two large government-sponsored mortgage companies. 
 
In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), this has reawakened contentious issues one 
thought had been finally settled. The region was moving away from public financial risk-bearing 
through  the  privatization  of  first-tier  public  banks  and  a  refocusing  of  development  banks 
towards  second-tier  lending,  well-targeted  guarantee  programs,  and  temporary,  catalytic 
developmental supports. However, development banks are now asking themselves whether they 
should grow bigger even in the good times, so as to play a more forceful role in the bad times. 
On the other hand, central bankers have become quite worried that their balance sheets (and 
hard-fought independence) might be compromised by political pressures to also play a more 
active RALR role. 
 
In  this  context,  interest  in  partial  credit  guarantee  programs  (PCGs)  has  surged.  The 
expansion of such programs is viewed by some as a desirable middle ground to expand the risk-
bearing role of the state while limiting the distortions resulting from its direct intervention in 
financial activities. However, the recent US experience has also been a useful reminder that 
public guarantees can be quite costly, in terms of both their potential fiscal costs and their impact 
on financial development and stability.  
 
The concerns derived from the fiscal costs of public guarantees are compounded by the 
fact that the conceptual foundations of these programs are quite shaky. Guarantee programs are 
often justified based on social objectives. However, the rationale underlying the preference for 
state  guarantees  over  other  forms  of  public  intervention  is  generally  left  unexplained. 
Alternatively, the need for state guarantees is based on the existence of market failures that need 
to be addressed.
2 The latter may be related to agency frictions (adverse selection, mora l hazard, 
lack  of  collateral) ,  or  c ollective  frictions  (un -internalized  externalities,  free  riding  and 
coordination failures). Again, however,  once a sufficiently broad welfare criterion is adopted 
(one that fully internalizes the fiscal cost of the  guarantees and the way it is allocated among 
taxpayers),  it becomes unclear why public guarantees can succeed where markets failed.  If 
guarantees are called for, why can’t private market participants fill up the gap? Similar questions 
seem to apply to nearly all forms of public financial risk bearing.  
 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Mankiw (1986), Smith and Stutzer (1989), 
Bernanke and Gert (1990), Innes (1991), Benavente et al. (2006), and Arping et al. (2008.  As discussed below, the 
papers  that  analyze  government  guarantees  in  a  general  equilibrium  setting  typically  have  focused  on  adverse 
selections problems and unanimously conclude that these problems do not justify guarantees (see Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1989; Gale, 1991; Williamson, 1994; Lacker, 1994; and Li, 1998). 3 
 
Despite the world-wide popularity of public sector credit guarantees,
3 typically granted 
via national  and multilateral  development  agencies and banks,  the theoretical  economics 
literature has devoted rather scant attention to the issue. As argued in this paper, Arrow and Lind 
(AL, 1970) remains as the most fundamental and enduring rationale for public sector guarantees, 
which hinges on risk aversion and the government’s superior capacity to spread risk across space 
and time. Curiously, however, this seminal paper has been mostly ignored in scholarly work on 
public guarantees.  
 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  policy  debate  by  setting  the  underpinnings  of  credit 
guarantees on a sounder theoretical footing. It analyzes the foundations of public risk-bearing 
from a finance paradigms perspective, using the conceptual framework developed in de la Torre 
and Ize (2010, 2011), which emphasizes the non-reducible, independent implications of four 
types of market failures, two of which (information asymmetry and enforcement costs) conform 
the agency paradigms, and the other two (collective action and collective cognition frictions) 
conform the collective paradigms.
 4  
 
The paper reaches the five following broad conclusions. First, when risk is idiosyncratic 
(hence is ultimately diversifiable), risk aversion is the key required justification for all forms of 
guarantees, whether private or public. In the absence of risk aversion among lenders, it is highly 
unlikely that a case for guarantees can be made based on  the traditional grounds of agency 
failures or externalities. Agency failures justify neither guarantees nor subsidies; externalities 
justify subsidies but not guarantees.  
 
Second, the state can spread idiosyncratic risk more broadly than markets by coordinating 
and  pooling  atomistic  agents  that  would  otherwise  not  organize  themselves  to  solve  agency 
frictions. Agency (information or enforcement) frictions lead to risk concentration (reflecting the 
need for sufficient ―skin in the game‖ to align principal-agent incentives) and thus get in the way 
of risk spreading. State guarantees may thus have an edge over private guarantees not because 
the state can better resolve the agency frictions but because it can better resolve the collective 
action frictions that undermine the market’s ability to overcome the agency frictions.  
 
Third, public guarantees can be justified on a transitory basis when financial systems are 
underdeveloped but as long as such guarantees aim at crowding in (rather than crowding out) the 
private sector. However, the permanent use of public guarantees may also be justified, even in 
mature financial systems, when the idiosyncratic risk is excessively fat-tailed. 
 
                                                 
3 As documented, for instance, in Honohan (2008) and Beck et al (2008). 
4  The  framework  developed  in  de  la  Torre  and  Ize  (2010,  2011)  considers  four  par adigms,  labeled  costly 
enforcement (CE), collective action (CA), asymmetric information (AI), and collective cognition (CC). Two of these 
paradigms  (CE  and  AI)  give  rise  to  bilateral  (agency)  market  failures  while  the  other  two  (CA  and  CC)  are 
associated with multilateral (social) market failures. At the same time, two paradigms (CE and CA) are founded on 
full information and  full rationality  while the other two  (AI and CC) are based on informational and learning 
frictions, possibly leading to bounded rationality. 4 
 
Fourth, the state can also put public guarantees to good use in the case of aggregate (non-
diversifiable) risk, even in the absence of agency frictions.
5 This is because private individuals 
faced with endogenous risk  and constrained by bargaining costs  can fail to coordinate so as to 
behave in a way that is consistent with their collective interest. In this case,  what matters is the 
coordinating (rather than risk spreading) ability of the state. 
 
Fifth,  going back to  the mentioned  basic  principles should help in rethinking and 
reorganizing the role of the state in financial development.  Greater transparency in explaining 
and justifying the role of the state is clearly called for. The comparative advantages of the state in 
resolving collective  and  of markets in resolving  agency  frictions  suggest that  the state and 
markets should naturally complement, rather than substitute for, or compete with, each other.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section  2 deals with the case  of pure 
agency frictions and no risk aversion. Section  3 adds collective action frictions but continues to 
assume away risk aversion. Section 4 combines risk aversion with pure agency frictions. Section 
5 adds collective action frictions to the brew . Section 6 expands the discussion to the case of 
aggregate risk. Section 7 discusses policy implications and issues. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  The case of pure agency frictions 
 
Consider first the case of idiosyncratic risk and pure agency frictions, assuming for now 
that lenders lack risk aversion (i.e., that they are risk neutral) and that there are no collective 
action frictions (derived from externalities or coordination problems). As is well known in the 
literature, asymmetric information  in  credit  markets,  even without risk aversion, can lead to 
socially inefficient outcomes of under-lending or over-lending.  For example, Jaffee and Russell 
(1976)  and  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981)  demonstrate  that  asymmetric  information  can  lead  to 
adverse selection as higher interest rates attract riskier borrowers, which can result in under-
lending as lenders may ration credit to a level that is below the socially desirable one.
6 
 
The appropriate policy response to these agency -driven market failures is not obvious , 
however. Most of the literature that finds that asymmetric information can justify state credit 
guarantees uses a partial equilibrium framework; that is, it does not consider the welfare effects 
of the taxes nee ded to finance the guarantees.  Instead, the  literature that uses a  general 
equilibrium  framework and applies  an appropriately stringent welfare criterion (requiring 
revenue neutrality and taking into account the distributional implications of the taxes levied to 
finance the state guarantees) systematically concludes that, in the absence of risk aversion, state 
                                                 
5  Aggregate  risk  (also  defined  in  the  finance  literature  as  systematic  risk)  refers  to  risk  that  affects  all  agents 
simultaneously within a given jurisdiction and is, therefore, non-diversifiable. Aggregate risk may or may not lead to 
systemic risk, where the entire financial system becomes affected and where risk may be compounded by agents’ 
endogenous responses and interdependencies. 
6 Over-lending can also occur:  when projects that would be equally profitable if successful have different  success 
probabilities, low interest rates can induce borrow ing under low success probabilities, even though their expected 
returns are below the social rate of return. See De Mezza and Webb (1987; 1999); and Beck and de la Torre (2006).  5 
 
guarantees cannot improve the market outcome, except when the state has an informational or 
enforcement advantage over the private sector, which is, in general, hard to argue.
7  
 
To help understand what is at stake, consider the student loan model of Mankiw (1986). 
This model focuses on the information asymmetry problem of adverse selection and assumes that 
lenders are risk -neutral.  Students’  honesty  varies  over  the  population.  However,  the  lender 
knows less than the borrowing student; specifically, he knows the mean of the distribution but 
not each individual student’s characteristics. Moreover, reflecting enforcement and informational 
frictions, the lender cannot force repayment and must thus raise the interest rate on all loans to 
cover the losses on the unpaid loans. But, by raising the price of all loans, the dishonest (those 
who do not intend to repay) prevent the honest (those committed to repaying) from borrowing. 
Because it would have been socially desirable for the honest to borrow, society is worse off. 
 
What can policy do about this? To answer this question, notice first that, in the absence of 
risk aversion, an unsubsidized guarantee (that is, a guarantee priced to cover expected losses) has 
no impact. While it reduces risk, this is of no consequence to a risk-neutral lender. The price of 
the guarantee matches the cost of the loan loss provisions that the lender would have to incur in 
the absence of the guarantee. As a result, the fairly priced guarantee adds no value and, hence, 
will not affect the lender’s behavior.  
 
By contrast, if the state provides a fully subsidized credit guarantee (a 100 percent default 
guarantee with a price equal to zero) the risk-neutral lender saves the cost of loan loss provisions 
and  is  thereby  induced  to  lend  to  all  students  at  the  risk-free  interest  rate.  From  a  partial 
equilibrium  viewpoint,  absent  a  requirement  of  revenue  neutrality,  the  subsidized  guarantee 
would, therefore, allow the social optimum to be reached. However, from a more stringent (and 
generally warranted) welfare perspective, the financing of the guarantee and the distribution of 
tax payments across the student population also matter. Unless the students who default also pay 
the tax, taxing only the nondefaulting students would make them worse off because they would 
end  up  paying  for  the  defaulting  students  (see  the  proof  in  Appendix  I).  Thus,  although  a 
subsidized  guarantee  could  be  socially  justified,  the  nondefaulting,  tax-paying  students 
(including those who would not borrow without the guarantee) would prefer to go without it.  
 
Clearly, taxing only the defaulting students would lead to a Pareto improvement. But 
doing so amounts to assuming that one can enforce taxation where one cannot enforce a loan 
repayment. The optimality of the (subsidized) guarantee in a Mankiw-type student loan model of 
adverse selection hinges, therefore, exclusively on a differential enforcement capacity. This does 
                                                 
7 The partial equilibrium literature that does not require revenue neutrality finds that state guarantees can improve 
things by increasing credit (e.g., Mankiw 1986; Smith and Stutzer 1989; Innes 1991; Benavente, Galetovic, and 
Sanhuenza 2006; Arping, Loranth, and Morrison 2010). The literature that takes a general equilibrium view (and 
hence imposes revenue neutrality) can be classified into two groups. The first group uses a Kaldor-Hicks welfare 
criterion that simply looks at the total size of the pie but not at its distribution across the population. With such a 
criterion, some papers predict that state guarantees can lead to an improved equilibrium (e.g., Ordover and Weiss 
1981; Bernanke and Gertler 1990; Innes 1992; and Athreya, Tam, and Young 2010). However, others do not (e.g., 
Li  1998;  Gale  1991;  Williamson  1994).  The  second  group  of  papers  incorporates  the  welfare  impacts  of  tax 
redistribution. The papers in this latter group (for instance, Greenwald and Stiglitz 1989; Lacker 1994) uniformly 
conclude that, without an informational advantage and the ability to cross-subsidize, it is not possible for state 
guarantees to produce a Pareto improvement. 6 
 
not make sense in a political system where the rule of law applies to states as well as to citizens. 
Any preferential loan collection capacity states may have should be made readily available to 
everyone through improving the judiciary, as part of a more supportive enabling environment. 
For similar reasons, a private agent might consider offering his screening services to the lender if 
he was better informed (hence better able to discriminate between the good loans and the bad 
loans) or better able to collect (hence make the dishonest pay for their sins). However, an agent 
with  such capabilities (for example, one  who is  able to benefit  from economies  of scale in 
putting together an effective sorting system for borrowers) would be in the business of selling 
services to banks, not in guaranteeing their loans. 
 
Broadly  similar  arguments  can  be  developed  when,  instead  of  adverse  selection,  the 
problem  underlying  the  failure  of  risk-neutral  creditors  to  lend  to  honest  students  is  one  of 
enforcement. Suppose, for example, that borrowers cannot obtain a loan because they lack good 
collateral and hence cannot credibly commit to repaying the loan. In this case, viable student 
borrowers  without  collateral  would  be  excluded  from  the  loan  market,  resulting  again  in  a 
socially inefficient equilibrium. By replacing the missing collateral, it is often argued, a state 
guarantee could bring such borrowers back into the market. The problem with this argument is 
that, absent any change in the students’ own ―skin in the game,‖ they would confront the same 
commitment-to-repay problem. Thus, unless the guarantee is fairly priced (so as to cover the 
expected loan losses and other costs) the loan default losses would simply be shifted to the state 
(the guarantor). But if the guarantee is fairly priced, risk-neutral lenders would not pay for it 
because, by definition, they care only about expected losses and not about the variance of such 
losses. Unless the state has an enforcement advantage vis-à-vis private lenders—which, as we 
already argued, is hard to justify—there is no case for a state guarantee. 
  
The discussion in this section can be summarized as follows. In a world devoid of risk 
aversion  and  collective  action  frictions,  agency  frictions  alone  do  not  in  general  justify 
guarantees under a general equilibrium viewpoint that uses an appropriately restrictive welfare 
criterion. While the market outcome would be inefficient, a state that does not know more or 
enforce better than the private sector is unlikely to improve the outcome via credit guarantees. 
Indeed, one would generally expect the state to have a comparative disadvantage in dealing with 
pure agency frictions rather than an advantage. If the state had a comparative advantage in this 
regard, the right policy would be only to have state-owned and state-run banks, which patently 
makes no sense.
8 More generally, in a world where distortions arise only from agency frictions, 
while the market equilibrium is inefficient, the state  is unlikely to  improve on it by assuming 
risk, because there is no wedge between private and social interests—principals and agents want 
the same thing that society wants, namely, to overcome agency frictions and engage in mutually 
beneficial financial contracts. The only legitimate role left for the state in such a world is to 




                                                 
8 Notice however that multilateral development banks (MDBs) that lend to public sectors to finance investment 
projects may enjoy informational advantages vis-à-vis private lenders, such as knowing more than private lenders 
about state processes and procedures. This may justify MDB guarantees even in a world characterized by pure 
agency failures with no risk aversion. 7 
 
3.  Adding collective action frictions 
 
Let us now add collective action frictions that manifest themselves in the form of social 
externalities—for  example,  positive  externalities  to  lending  that  are  not  internalized  by  the 
private  lender.  However,  we  continue  to  assume  that  risk  is  idiosyncratic  and  lenders  risk-
neutral.  The literature generally concludes that, in the absence of information asymmetries, any 
credit policy, including guarantees, is ineffective in improving the equilibrium outcome unless 
subsidized.
9 Indeed, subsidies and taxes are generally shown to be the best policy responses to a 
market failure arising from un-internalized externalities. However, the literature concludes that it 




To see what is at stake, notice first that in the Mankiw (1986) m odel of pure agency 
frictions the dishonest inflict negative  informational  externalities  on  the  honest.  However, 
barring differential taxation or enforcement capacity, there is no way for the state to internalize 
such externalities. There is no collective action failure. The dishonest are simply getting away 
with mischief. Even if bargaining were costless, it would not pay for the honest to buy out the 
dishonest. Indeed, using the same reasoning as in the previous section, the honest would have to 
make a transfer payment to the dishonest that exactly matches the tax payments that would be 
required to cover a subsidized state guarantee or an interest rate subsidy. Similarly, even though 
it seems obvious that one should lend to every student whose return exceeds the social cost of 
funds, a state banker without an informational or enforcement advantage should not lend and 
behave exactly like a private banker.       
   
How  would  adding  social  externalities  and  collective  action  frictions  change  this 
conclusion?  Suppose  lending  to  some  targeted  students  (say,  the  ones  studying  to  become 
primary school teachers) has positive social externalities (e.g., a good basic education enhances 
the earning potential from college education in all fields of study). The market outcome would be 
inefficient even if private lenders could solve agency problems and properly identify all the 
creditworthy  students.  Private  lenders,  by  pricing  all  loans  uniformly,  would  fail  to  lend 
sufficiently to students planning to be primary school teachers because their earnings prospects 
are mediocre, even though those students can contribute the most to other students’ earnings. The 
private lender does not internalize the externality. There is now a clear case of a collective action 
failure. Should students of all generations and in all fields of study be able to get together, 
bargain an agreement and enforce it at no cost, they would agree on setting aside part of the 
increase in their future earnings resulting from a better primary education in order to subsidize 
the interest rates on the loans to future primary school teachers.  
 
However,  in  the  presence  of  collective  action  frictions,  students  will  not  be  able  to 
coordinate their actions to ensure a socially beneficial outcome. Instead, where wage subsidies to 
school teachers are not an available option, the state can resolve this externalities-driven market 
failure by coordinating agents through an interest rate subsidy program favoring loans to the 
would-be teachers and paid for by all other students. Since informational frictions require that 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Raith, Staak, and Starke (2006), Penner and Silber (1973) and Lombra and Wasylenko (1984).  
10 See Stiglitz, Vallejo, and Park (1993), Calomiris and Himmelberg (1994), and Bhattacharya (1997). 8 
 
bankers screen potential borrowers and monitor their performance, and since such efforts are 
costly, targeted interest rate subsidies dominate targeted and subsidized guarantees. While both 
policy instruments can similarly expand the level of targeted lending, the interest rate subsidy is 
preferable because it is less likely to distort the lender’s screening and monitoring incentives (the 
lender retains ―full skin in the game‖). This illustrates that, as long as there is no risk aversion, 
collective action frictions alone can establish a good case for tax and subsidy policy but not for 
state credit guarantees. 
 
But there might also be cases where the state’s cost of monitoring whether private lenders 
appropriately screen loan applicants according to the social criteria it set forth is greater than the 
cost of simply setting up a first-tier state bank that directly provides the subsidized loans.
11 In 
such cases, the assumption by the state of the risks associated  with financial activities can be 
justified on the basis of the state’s capacity to address agency frictions (that is, ensuring that the 
loans are given to the most socially desirable borrowers). However, it is crucial to note that such 
agency frictions arise out of an underlying collective action failure that prevents markets from 
internalizing externalities. 
    
The bottom line for this section is, therefore, as follows. When social externalities and 
collective action frictions are added to agency frictions in a world devoid of risk aversion, the 
case for state intervention becomes clear, but it is hardly in the form of credit guarantees. When 
these frictions are relatively light, the state might limit its intervention to that of a catalyst that 
brings together all interested parties and facilitates the transfers across parties required for a 
mutually  beneficial  equilibrium.  When  the  frictions  are  harder  to  overcome,  the  state  can 
circumvent  them  through  a  targeted  tax-subsidy  program,  which  internalizes  externalities. 
However, the implementation of this program may run into agency frictions. Thus, depending on 
whether the state or the markets can better address these latter frictions, it might be optimal for 
the  state  to  subsidize  the  loans  provided  by  private  lenders  or  to  provide  the  loans  directly 
through a first-tier state bank. Remarkably, however, the basic motivation underlying the state’s 
intervention is always the need to address collective frictions, which introduce a wedge between 
private and social interests that markets cannot resolve on their own.  
 
4.  Adding risk aversion to agency frictions 
 
Let us now add risk aversion among private lenders while reverting to the case of pure 
agency frictions (that is, assuming the absence of collective action frictions). Arrow and Lind 
(AL 1970) remains the most fundamental and enduring conceptual framework for understanding 
the role of the state in bearing risk when there is risk aversion. AL first show that, when risk is 
spread in small amounts over large numbers of investors, capital can be priced at risk-neutral 
prices. They then argue that the state’s inter-temporal tax and borrowing capacity gives it a 
unique ability to  spread risk across large populations.  Thus, state guarantees  (as  opposed to 
subsidies or loans) are naturally called for to reduce the cost of risk bearing and to encourage 
private investment or lending in the face of high risk or high risk aversion. 
                                                 
11 The argument that the state may be able to provide incentives to public lenders more easily than to private ones is 
in line with Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) result that increasing the incentives along a measurable performance 
dimension (costs or profitability) reduces the incentives along nonmeasurable dimensions. For a fuller discussion 
along these lines of the role of first-tier public banks, see also IDB (2005).  9 
 
 
Curiously, the literature on partial credit guarantees (PCGs) has mostly ignored the AL 
perspective.  In  the  scant  literature  on  this  subject,  a  dominant  theme  is  a  rebuttal  of  the 
proposition that there is anything unique in the state’s capacity to spread risk. For example, Klein 
(1996) argues that if the state’s advantage did not lie purely in its coercive taxation powers (that 
is, its capacity to oblige taxpayers to bear unwanted risk through the tax system), then markets 
would be able to spread risk just as efficiently. But as AL themselves suggest, it may not be 
possible for the private sector to be completely risk-neutral, even when risk is spread through 
broad ownership. Since the controlling shareholders of a firm need to hold large blocks of stock 
and such holdings are likely to be a significant portion of their wealth, the costs of risk bearing 
are not negligible and the firm should behave as a risk averter. Thus, although AL hints at the 
existence of a link between risk aversion and agency problems (adequate monitoring implies 
large stake exposures), they do not develop it, nor has the literature picked up on that theme. 
 
To help analyze whether there is indeed something unique about the state’s risk-bearing 
capacity, we introduce risk aversion into the well-known monitoring model of Calomiris and 
Khan  (1989).  An  entrepreneur  funds  a  risky  project  through  a  mix  of  retail  and  wholesale 
funding. Projects that are doomed to fail can be liquidated—thereby salvaging some of their 
value—if they are so identified at an early stage through monitoring. Retail investors do not 
monitor because they have too small a stake in the project relative to the cost of monitoring. 
Instead, wholesalers can engage in monitoring because they can recoup their investments in 
failing projects. However, they will only do so only if they have sufficiently large stakes in the 
project (sufficient ―skin in the game‖) to warrant incurring the monitoring costs. In the absence 
of risk aversion (the case analyzed by Calomiris and Khan), wholesalers do not need to be paid a 
risk premium to bear such risk. Hence, it is not socially costly for them to retain ―skin in the 
game.‖ Entrepreneurs can therefore contract enough wholesale funding to allow wholesalers to 
fully recoup the cost of the socially efficient level of monitoring. An efficient equilibrium is 
therefore obtained where monitoring costs can be absorbed without having to spread any risk.
 12 
 
But suppose now that wholesalers are risk-averse. Having ―skin in the game‖ raises the 
cost  of  wholesale  funds,  resulting  in  an  inefficient  equilibrium  with  insufficient  wholesale 
funding,  hence  insufficient  monitoring.  A  guarantor  buying  the  risk  that  is  concentrated  in 
wholesalers and spreading it by reselling it in small amounts to retailers could therefore improve 
in principle the market equilibrium. In doing so, however, the guarantor faces and must solve 
three  interrelated  problems.  First,  since  monitoring  is  costly,  the  guarantee  undermines 
wholesalers’ incentives to monitor the entrepreneur and his project. This is the standard moral 
hazard problem of insurance markets. To avoid distorting wholesalers’ monitoring incentives, 
the guarantor can monitor wholesalers and adjust the premium of the guarantee according to how 
well they perform their monitoring. However, monitoring the monitor also has a cost. Second, 
the  guarantor’s  capacity  to  resell  the  risk  to  retailers  will  itself  depend  on  his  capacity  to 
convince them that he is doing a good job himself at monitoring wholesalers and, hence, is 
offering retailers a fairly priced risk-sharing deal. Retailers need therefore to be able to monitor 
the guarantor’s own monitoring efforts. But this again has a cost. Third, in order to spread risk 
                                                 
12 This is indeed the main result in Calomiris-Khan. However, Huang and Ratnovsky (2011) challenge this result by 
showing that in the presence of noisy public information, wholesalers may have an incentive to free ride on this 
information and run early when needed rather than to monitor.  10 
 
over a sufficiently large base, guarantors need to have a sufficiently broad clientele. However, 
even in the absence of informational frictions, retailers’ participation may be limited due to un-
internalized externalities (i.e., individuals’ failure to take into account that the social benefits of 
their participation exceed the individual net benefits) and other collective action frictions. In this 
section, we assume away such collective action frictions (we come back to them in the next 
section) and focus exclusively on informational frictions. 
 
Suppose that the guarantor finds an efficient way of monitoring wholesalers (and can 
include monitoring costs in the guarantee price). Can the guarantor then convince those to whom 
he tries to sell risk that he is doing a good monitoring job? Because it is in the guarantor’s own 
interest to have his monitoring certified (he will not be able to sell risk otherwise), and because 
they can include the certification cost in the price of their guarantee, guarantors can pay someone 
(say, a rating agency) to do the certification. However, this pushes the monitoring pyramid up 
one more layer, as retailers, in turn, need to be convinced that the rating agency has done a good 
job  certifying  guarantors.  If monitoring the rating agencies could  be done without cost, this 
would solve the problem. But this would in practice not be a trivial task and would likely involve 
costs. The potential conflicts  of interest  between bond issuers and rating agencies that have 
emerged at the heart of the post-crisis debate on regulatory reform are testimony to the difficulty 
of solving this problem.  
 
However, in the absence of participation and other collective action frictions, market 
arrangements to monitor the rating agencies should spring up, the costs being added to the other 
monitoring costs incurred at other levels of the monitoring pyramid. The compounded costs of 
monitoring  should  thus  ultimately  be  factored  in  the  price  of  the  guarantee,  to  be  paid  by 
wholesalers as part of the insurance premium. Nonetheless, for risk to be fully spreadable (hence 
for  full  guarantees  to  restore  the  first  best,  fully  efficient  equilibrium),  these  compounded 
monitoring costs should be lower than the benefits of monitoring (the gains from early project 
liquidations). At the same time, the costs of monitoring the monitor should be lower than the 
costs that wholesalers’ would otherwise have to incur in directly monitoring the project (i.e., the 
borrowers). Hence, there should be efficiency gains as one goes up the monitoring pyramid (see 
the proofs in Appendix II). There is, therefore, a fundamental positive correspondence between 
the market’s capacity to spread risk through guarantees and its capacity to limit monitoring costs 
through an effective monitoring pyramid.  
 
Remarkably, however, these monitoring costs do not depend on whether the state or the 
markets  provide  the  guarantees.  A  state  guarantor  will  face  exactly  the  same  monitoring 
problems and constraints as a private guarantor. Indeed, a good argument can be made that 
private guarantors should generally be better at dealing with informational frictions than public 
guarantors. Thus, in the absence of participation and other collective action frictions, private 
guarantors should naturally emerge, leaving no role for public guarantees. The only likely role 
for  the  state  would  be  to  strengthen  the  enabling  environment  so  as  to  help  alleviate  the 
informational (or enforcement) frictions that hinder risk spreading by the private sector. 
 
The argument in this section can thus be summarized as follows. Unless risk is properly 
spread  out,  risk  aversion,  combined  with  agency  frictions,  introduce  a  deadweight  cost  that 
constitutes a first source of market inefficiency. A guarantee may thus lower the cost of capital 11 
 
by  spreading  risk  more  broadly.  However,  the  guarantee  introduces  moral  hazard,  a  second 
source of market inefficiency. Hence, to fully spread risk (through full, one hundred percent 
guarantees) without introducing incentive distortions, it is critically important that the monitoring 
pyramid be sufficiently efficient. If the costs of monitoring the monitor are sufficiently low, the 
market solution can replicate the optimal solution by replacing a socially costly ―skin-in-the-
game‖  requirement  for  good  monitoring  by  a  more  efficient  (cheaper)  pyramidal  market 
monitoring arrangement with full risk spreading. In the absence of substantial collective action 
frictions, the guarantees are likely to be provided more effectively by markets than by the state. 
 
5.  Combining collective action frictions, agency frictions, and risk aversion 
 
Let us now add back collective action frictions to the brew, so that we now have the 
simultaneous presence of agency frictions, collective action frictions, and risk aversion. Even if 
all information frictions are resolved, the guarantor needs to pool a sufficient number of retailers 
to underwrite the guarantee. This may require solving market participation frictions. In view of 
the atomicity of their investments, absent a market architecture that allows for pooling, retailers 
may not bother to participate. While it would be socially desirable for them to participate in the 
risk market so as to spread risk efficiently, individual retailers may not internalize this positive 
participation externality.
13 Instead, the participation disincentives faced by retailers may require 
the guarantor to incur costs (for example, in advertising) in order to attract investors.  
 
In a well-developed financial system, the guarantor would not have to deal directly with 
retailers. Instead, an additional layer of agents —the  asset  managers  (mutual  funds,  pension 
funds, hedge funds, and the like)—could pool retail investors for the guarantor, thereby reducing 
the  costs  of  participation.  But  in  an  undeveloped  financial  system,  the  costs  of  mobilizing 
participation will be higher, so that adding them to the guarantor’s certification costs might well 
raise total costs to a point where the guarantee is no longer viable. Thus, the ability of the 
guarantor to unload risk will very much depend on how well-developed financial markets are. In 
mature financial systems, the market can resolve participation frictions through a deep network 
of asset managers. In an undeveloped system, such frictions remain unresolved.  
 
This is precisely where the state can help to complete markets. A state guarantor can 
spread  risk  without  having  to  market  it  (the  risk  distribution  is  taken  care  of  through  well-
established frameworks for taxation and public decision-making) and can, therefore, effectively 
resolve participation failures. Thus, there is a clear infant industry argument for transitory state 
guarantees when financial systems suffer from low participation (low financial inclusion). In 
addition,  the  state  may  need  to  help  close  the  monitoring  pyramid.  With  collective  action 
frictions,  the  necessary  arrangements  to  monitor  rating  agencies  may  not  spring  up  by 
themselves. Closing the monitoring pyramid may require the provision of a public good in the 
form of official oversight over the market monitors. 
 
If  idiosyncratic  risk  is  fat-tailed,  state  guarantees  may  also  be  justified  on  a  more 
permanent basis, because even the more developed financial markets may not be able to reach 
                                                 
13 Participation externalities occur when the gains in participating in an activity depend on the number of other 
agents  participating  as  well  (see  Diamond,  1982;  and  Pagano,  1989).  By  hindering  coordination,  participation 
frictions prevent agents from internalizing such externalities. 12 
 
the scale of participation needed to atomize and distribute the risk sufficiently.
14 State guarantees 
can spread the risk all the more finely because they can do so across currently living taxpayers 
and across generations within a given jurisdiction. However, even in the case of intergenerational 
risk spreading, the state sector’s advantage derives again from its capacity to address a collective 
action (participation) friction, rather than an enforcement (agency) friction.
15 Indeed, trying to 
depict  the  inability  of  markets  to  contract  across  generations  from  a  pure  enforcement 
perspective is rather futile. Since it is not possible to write bilateral contracts with someone 
unborn, ―enforcing‖ such contracts is meaningless. Instead, the state has an edge because of the 
intergenerational burden sharing that the political system is naturally designed to achieve.
16 
 
In sum, the risk spreading ability of the state and, hence, the rationale for state guarantees 
ultimately rest on the comparative advantage of the state in resolving collective action frictions , 
which is the traditional justification for public goods. State guarantees may have an edge over 
private guarantees not because the state can better resolve agency frictions but because collective 
action frictions may disable the market’s ability to resolve such agency frictions. Where private 
lenders are risk-averse,  and even where risks  are idiosyncratic and therefore diversifiable in 
principle, the state can spread the risk more broadly than the market by resolving participation 
externalities—that is, the state can pool atomistic investors (or taxpayers) that would otherwise 
not participate in underwriting the guarantee. Taxation should thus be viewed not as a device to 
force  unwilling  taxpayers  to  share  risks  (as  in  Klein  1996),  but  rather  as  a  simple,  built-in 
coordination mechanism that facilitates the participation of all. However, for state guarantees to 
be desirable, it is critically important that their adverse impact on monitoring and enforcement 
incentives be limited.  
 
                                                 
14  In  principle,  the  AL  argument  continues  to  apply:  no  matter  how  lumpy  the  risk,  it  can  still  be  distributed 
atomistically, provided there are enough retailers over which the risk can be spread. In AL, the number of retailers 
can go all the way to infinity. In practice, however, there is an important difference between a large number and an 
infinite number. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, participation frictions limit market depth even in well-
developed financial systems. Thus, the number of retailers over which risk can be spread, even if large, may not be 
sufficient. That is why there may be a point at which a permanent public guarantee may be needed, even in mature 
systems, to bound the risk associated with unpredictable returns or where there is some probability, even if very 
small, of very large losses. Knightian uncertainty—when decision makers cannot determine the probabilities of 
events (see Epstein, 1999)—is likely to have an effect similar to fat tails. The more uncertain the risk, the more 
finely it needs to be distributed, which, in principle, makes more of a case for public guarantees. 
15 There may be one exception, however, in which the public sector may have a genuine advantage in dealing with 
agency frictions. Lenders and entrepreneurs may deal with each other on the basis of proprietary  information and 
relationship lending. While private guarantors need to access this information to understand the risks , the lenders 
involved in these private deals may be reluctant to share the information since  they might lose proprietary rents 
when the information is leaked. In this case,  a public guarantor could have an edge because it might, arguably, be 
less likely to leak the information. Be as it may, such advantages, if they exist, should gradually vanish as financial 
systems mature and information becomes increasingly public. 
16 Enforcement frictions (the other important type of agency frictions) may also help justify the need for public 
guarantees but, as with informational frictions, not because the state has any natural advantage in enforcing 
contracts. As already noted in Section 2, there is no credible reason why enforcement failures can be resolved 
through  the  state’s  uncontested  ability  to  tax  but  not  through  well-formulated  private  contracts  and  a  well-
functioning judiciary. Instead, the state may have an edge because costly contract enforcement is likely to require 
cost sharing, which again faces a collective action problem that the state can resolve more successfully than markets. 
In turn, taxation should not be viewed (as in Klein 1996) as a mechanism to oblige unwilling taxpayers to share 
risks, but instead as a simple, built-in coordination mechanism that facilitates the participation of all. 13 
 
6.  Aggregate risk 
 
Consider finally the case of aggregate (non-diversifiable) risk. State guarantees can be 
justified on a permanent basis in the presence of non-diversifiable risk, including that which is 
endogenously brewed in the process of financial development itself. The rationale in this case, 
however,  no  longer  derives  from  risk  spreading  but  rather  from  the  state’s  capacity  to  help 
coordinate agents’ actions around an efficient risk-sharing equilibrium.   
 
Aggregate  risk  has  three  main  threads.  First,  it  is  likely  to  be  correlated  with 
consumption, wealth, and income. As a result, the risk-spreading argument in AL no longer 
holds, and agents may require a significant risk premium to bear risk. Second, aggregate risk 
may become endogenous and prone to multiple equilibria, turning into systemic risk, as in the 
typical  bank  run  setting  of  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983).  Finally,  aggregate  shocks  may  be 
associated with extreme uncertainty, inducing agents to abandon altogether the expected utility-
maximizing framework and to choose instead a min-max criterion such that they minimize their 
exposure to the maximum possible loss. In the latter case, the choices made by individual agents 
may cease to be fully rational, as each agent can behave as if he was affected more than the 
average.
17 In all of these cases, risk is non-diversifiable and the AL risk-spreading argument no 
longer holds.  In particular, when risk is endogenous or agents abandon the expected utility 
framework  due to uncertainty , the total cost of risk bearing remains the same  even  as the 
population  of taxpayers  becomes large, making risk non -diversifiable.  Similarly, because 
correlated risk applies to an investor deciding whether to invest in a private guarantee scheme as 
much as to a taxpayer deciding whether to vote for a state guarantee scheme, the state  no longer 
has a natural risk-neutrality advantage. 
 
However, state guarantees are still useful in the case of aggregate risk because they help 
resolve collective action failures. For instance, when agents minimize their exposure to a worst-
case risk scenario (which leads to a socially inefficient equilibrium compared to the case where 
agents behave in view of the average risk), the state can be in some sense more rational than the 
agents it represents. B y eliminating such a scenario, state guarantees effectively  function as a 
coordination device, much as deposit guarantees and lender-of-last-resort facilities can eliminate 
self-fulfilling bank runs. In the case of correlated risk,  state guarantees can still improve things 
by helping avert the collective action fa ilures that magnify the impact of a systemic event. By 
coordinating agents’ behavior around a collectively  desirable outcome, state  guarantees  help 
reduce the risk of catastrophic downturns, thereby smoothing out private consumption, which, in 
turn, helps reduce the costs associated with risk aversion and lowers the required risk premium. 
 
7.  Toward a rebalanced policy 
 
  The main message from the above conceptual analysis is that the state should play to its 
strengths—helping resolve collective action failures—rather than its weaknesses—dealing with 
agency frictions. This implies that the state should seek to complement (rather than substitute 
                                                 
17 See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and the more novel contributions of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) and 
Caballero and Kurlat (2009) on the role of public guarantees under uncertainty. More generally, one could also 
argue that the state could behave collectively in a more rational way than individuals when the latter are subjected to 
systematic behavioral biases.   14 
 
for) markets, crowding in the private sector and harnessing its comparative advantage in dealing 
with agency problems rather than crowding it out.
  
 
This opens three broad avenues to explore. The first, the least controversial, comprises 
policy  interventions  exclusively  geared  at  solving  participation  frictions—both  along  the 
intensive margin (the same players engaged in more transactions) and the extensive margin (the 
incorporation  of  new  players)—without  dealing  directly  with  risk.  Rising  financial  inclusion 
makes it easier for the financial services industry to lower costs as well as to expand market 
liquidity  and  other  positive  spillovers  associated  with  scale  and  network  effects,  thereby 
ultimately helping diversify risk. This justifies the state’s catalytic roles portrayed in the previous 
section. But it can also explain the establishment and operation by central banks of large-value 
payments  systems,  the  promotion  by  the  state  sector  of  clearing,  settlement,  and  trading 
infrastructures, or the spearheading by the state of the standardization of contracts. It can also 
justify  mandated—or  gently  coerced—participation,  as  in  the  case  of  the  payment  of  state 
employee  wages  through  accounts  in  banks  that  participate  in  a  shared,  open-architecture 
platform for retail payments. Alternatively, the creation of mandatory but privately administered 
pension funds can help promote the development of annuities (as in Chile), which in turn can 
help develop a market for spreading the risk associated with long-term instruments. Given the 
presence of positive externalities, the state can also use well-targeted subsidies as part of these 
interventions.  
 
The second avenue deals with risk by promoting private sector risk-spreading. This can 
be done through catalytic efforts or compulsory schemes. As an example of the first type, the 
state can promote, without taking risk, private sector participation in guarantee schemes, such as 
mutual  guarantee  associations  funded  by  small  local  entrepreneurs,  or  guarantee  schemes 
structured as joint stock companies with private participation. The experience across the world 
with such schemes has been generally positive, partly because they promote peer pressure, a 
purely private form of resolving collective frictions. Indeed, there is some evidence that such 
associations work best when they remain purely private, as this fully preserves incentives for 
group monitoring and limits moral hazard.
18 As an example of the second type (compulsory risk-
sharing arrangements), the state can mandate the participation in  automobile or health insurance 
schemes. 
 
Clearly, the first two avenues above should be exp lored and exploited as a matter of 
priority. However, improvements in the enabling environment may not suffice. Nor might p eer 
pressure or compulsory participation  work in all cases and all environments. Thus, the third 
avenue, more controversial and thorny, involves risk absorption and risk spreading  by the state, 
often through second-tier state banks, whether through guarantees or long-term loans.
19 In either 
case, it is the interaction of risk aversion, agency (monitoring) frictions, and participation 
                                                 
18 On the experience of mutual guarantee associations in Europe see Columba, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2009). 
Lebanon provides an interesting example of a seemingly successful and profitable guarantee scheme structured as a 
joint stock company.  
19A long-term finance commitment can be viewed as a funding (liability) guarantee that provides protection against 
liquidity risk and price volatility, instead of credit default. Thus, instead of the development bank actua lly funding 
the commercial bank, an equivalent arrangement would be for the development bank to provide swap and lender -of-
last-resort facilities. 15 
 
frictions, together with the superior capacity of the state to resolve entrenched collective action 
problems, which justifies state insurance, even where risk is idiosyncratic (hence diversifiable). 
As noted, state guarantees may be temporary—a strictly developmental tool aimed at facilitating 
risk discovery and circumventing transitional collective action frictions—or permanent (in the 
face of fat-tailed or aggregate risk).  
 
However, typically state-sponsored credit guarantee programs that are developmentally 
oriented do not seem to be, at first glance, fully consistent with such first principles. They seem 
to be permanent rather than transitory and they tend to target well-defined, recurrent, limited 
risks  instead  of  insufficiently  understood  risks  or  tail  risks  where  the  state’s  comparative 
advantage  in  risk  bearing  and  spreading  could  be  more  fully  exploited.  Moreover,  these 
guarantee programs are typically justified based on asymmetric information, lack of collateral, or 
externalities instead of risk aversion. What explains these apparent disconnects?  
 
Political economy offers one explanation. Correcting agency problems that hinder, for 
instance, SME lending (presumably ripe with positive social externalities) and lending to the 
lower-income households (presumably ripe with equity benefits if not externalities) sells better in 
the polity than correcting problems of risk spreading and differential risk aversion. In addition, it 
is not popular for the state to take on risk from private banks, even when doing so is fairly 
priced, because it smacks of a bailout. Moreover, if the aim is strictly risk spreading, where 
should  a  risk-neutral  state  draw  the  line?  Should  the  state  sector  reinsure  or  guarantee  all 
productive lending at the risk frontier, not just financing to SMEs? Should state guarantees apply 
to all long-maturity loans, irrespective of firm size? Expanding the risk frontier across the board 
is naturally unpalatable to politicians insofar as they are held accountable. Indeed, over the years, 
parliaments in LAC and many other regions have strictly limited risk taking by state banks. 
Moreover, state bank managers are naturally risk-averse. They protect their capital because they 
know that they will live or die with it.
20 And as already noted, the constraints that development 
banks face in terms of avoiding losses often induce them to compete with commercial banks in 
order to reap high returns for low risks, rather than —as  the  risk-aversion  rationale  would 
suggest—to complement private activity by insuring risk taking at the frontier. 
 
Instead, state guarantees to SMEs or to target clienteles, such as those reached through 
low-income housing or student loans programs, look like safe bets when they are well within the 
risk frontier. They appear to pay for themselves (hence are fiscally safe) when well priced and 
designed.
21 Moreover, early research seems to indicate that partial credit guarantees supplied by 
states do provide at least some additionality.
22 Why, then, not safely collect the low-hanging fruit 
instead of shooting for the moon? This preference for seemingly low -risk/high-political-return 
programs has been accentuated over the last decade or two in LAC and other regions, especially 
in the context of mediocre growth, high structural unemployment, and tight fiscal constraints. 
                                                 
20 Development banks in Mexico, for instance, are regulated and supervised on par with commercial banks and are 
required by law to preserve the real value of their capital. 
21 See Honohan (2008) and Beck, Klapper, and Mendoza (2010). 
22 See Larrain and Quiroz (2006), Haines, Madill, and Riding (2007), and Arvai, Rocha, and Saadani (2011). 16 
 
Lending  or  credit  guarantee  programs  to  those  most  affected  by  economic  hardship  have 
provided a convenient safety valve to relieve some of the build-up in political pressure.
23    
  
But the tendency of development banks not to move too aggressively towards the risk 
frontier reflects not just the political economy. It also reflects legitimate difficulties, particularly 
with the accurate pricing of guarantees. As noted, state guarantees are welfare-enhancing only as 
long and as far as all risks and the incentive distortions caused by state guarantees have been 
properly recognized and priced in. However risks at the frontier are not well understood and they 
may be abnormally d istributed, with fatter tails. Under such circumstances, the pricing of 
guarantees  becomes  inherently  difficult,  as  the  estimation  of  expected  losses  and  the 
decomposing of risk premia are subject to much error. Indeed, there are chilling cases of major 
failures and losses in ambitious state insurance programs that have aggressively aimed at 
crowding in the private sector towards the risk frontier. In part, such failures have reflected a 
misjudgment of expected losses.  
 
Where does all of this leave us? First, it is time for state lending and insurance programs 
to come clean as regards their rationale and the minimal conditions for success. Instead of 
justifying state loan and guarantee programs based on goals, as is so of ten the case and with 
which it is so hard to disagree, policy makers need to focus instead on  alternative means of 
achieving these goals. Thus, state risk-bearing programs should be justified by comparing their 
costs and benefits to those of alternative channels of state intervention that do not involve any 
state risk taking. Where guarantee programs are deemed appropriate, the programs’ objectives, 
mandates, and reporting and disclosure requirements need to be refocused around a risk-aversion 
and risk-spreading rationale, more clearly linked to the agency or collective action frictions with 
which risk aversion interacts. They also need to explain why the state can achieve that which 
markets  cannot.  Either  these  programs  are  really  self-sustaining  and  therefore  should  be 
eventually  divested  to  the  private  sector,  or  there  are  complex  or  hidden  risks  (fat-tailed  or 
systemic) that free markets cannot handle well and that need to be explicitly recognized and 
accounted  for.  Unless  this  is  done  right  and  state  guarantees  are  reasonably  priced,  state 
guarantees  will  likely  end  up  unduly  subsidizing  risk-taking,  and  this  is  bound  to  distort 
incentives and trigger unpleasant fiscal surprises (as well as political upheavals) once downsides 
materialize (the recent U.S. experience in the subprime crisis is, of course, the most obvious 
illustration). 
 
It is, thus, not enough that state guarantee programs break even in good times. Break-
even conditions should be evaluated through the cycle, i.e., considering longer-term trends. If 
priced  right,  these  programs  should  accumulate  reserves  in  the  good  times  against  potential 
losses in the bad times. For tail risk, this implies charging for the full expected value of the tail 
losses. One possible approach to facilitate risk discovery is to auction the guarantees according 
to their coverage or price.
24 By setting volumes rather than prices, guarantors can better protect 
themselves against the risk of major mispricing. At the same time, volumes may be adjusted to 
meet countercyclical objectives. They can be raised in systemic downturns when upward jumps 
                                                 
23 See Rajan (2010). 
24 This is the approach followed in Chile by FOGAPE. See Benavente, Galetovic and Sanhueza (2006) and de la 
Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007c). 17 
 
in private risk aversion are more likely to trigger coordination failures and reduced in upturns 
when  risk  appetite  can  swell,  fueling  excessive  credit  expansion.  To  avoid  head-to-head 
competition with the private sector in providing primary insurance, the state sector should prefer 
to provide its support through well-targeted reinsurance against tail risks.  
 
As  financial  systems  mature—and  hence  more  information  to  assess  and  price  risk 
becomes  available—state  loan  and  guarantee  programs  can  be  better  targeted.  For  example, 
when risk scoring methods are available, fairly-priced state guarantees can be targeted to be at, 
or just outside, the risk frontier, so as to ensure that finance reaches clients and projects that are 
too risky for private institutions to lend without guarantees. When loans are made directly by 
first-tier public banks, making sure the interest rates on the loans are above market rates can help 
ensure that public risk bearing does not crowd out private risk bearing.
25     
 
The farther one seeks to move away from the private risk frontier, the more caution is of 
course called for. However, risk taking can be bounded and state governance protected in a 
variety of ways. For example, earmarked capital for specific insurance or countercyclical risk 
absorption can help state banks assume more risk in a responsible, bounded manner while 
protecting their capital from depletion. Alternatively, to align incentives, state banks can assume 
a limited part of the risk, the rest being covered by the state through earmarked capital or other 
means. Private-state partnerships in which the state assumes most (but not all) of the risk at a fair 
price may help facilitate price and risk discovery. Enhanced transparency, better measurement of 
risk and returns, and more sophisticated checks and balances (for example through recurrent 
assessments by independent evaluation units or occasional, more strategic reviews by blue -
ribbon committees) should also all help strengthen the governance of state banks or other state 
entities engaging in higher-risk activities. 
 
However, there might be cases where, in order to internalize externalities, states may be 
better off dealing directly with borrowers through a first-tier state bank (that is, becoming agents) 
than through guarantees provided by a second -tier state bank. In particular, it has been argued 
that, in downturns, partial guarantees may not be sufficient to overcome bankers’ heightened risk 
aversion. Thus, unless states are willing to assume most or all of the risk, which could subject 
them  to  unacceptably  high  losses,  guarantee  programs  may  fail  to  provide  an  effective 
countercyclical tool. Instead, as the argument goes, first-tier state banking provides the only 
reliable channel to increase lending in a reasonably safe fashion, that is, ―when the going gets 
tough, only state banks get going.‖ As reasonable as this argument may sound, it can also be 
turned on its head. The more state banks compete head-to-head with private banks, the less 
private lenders are likely to share information with a state guarantor. Hence, a noncompeting 
state sector, one that complements but does not substitute, may in fact be best able to maintain an 
open access to the private information that it needs to monitor the banks and extend the coverage 
of the guarantees during downturns in a fiscally responsible way. 
 
An important final question is whether state banks should be supervised as private banks. 
In the case of first-tier state banks, the answer is an unqualified yes. Since state and private banks 
                                                 
25 Some lending and guarantee programs by development banks in high-income countries are structured in this way. 
The Business Development Bank Canada (BDC) small business loan guarantee program is a prime example. See 
Rudolph (2009).  18 
 
compete for the same business (they are potential substitutes, at least to a degree), they should be 
regulated and supervised in exactly the same way as private banks. For second-tier state banks, 
the answer is not so clear, however. Because such banks are in the business of ensuring against 
tail risks, the tolerance range involved in calibrating their capital under a value at risk criterion 
will need, by construction, to be less strict than that applied to private banks. At the same time, 
the emphasis on uncertain, frontier risk requires a different type of supervision. It should rely on 
high-end, holistic assessments by panels of experts that balance the economy-wide costs and 
benefits of the programs that the state bank engages in rather than ready-made, one-size-fits-all 
rules aimed at ensuring financial stability. 
 
8.  Concluding thoughts 
 
We  conclude  by  highlighting  some  aspects  of  this  paper’s  main  contributions  to  the 
debate on public risk-bearing. We do it by addressing four basic policy questions concerning 
public sector guarantees that are mainly oriented to fostering financial development and financial 
inclusion (rather than those mainly oriented to dealing with systematic risk). 
 
Is the traditional emphasis on agency frictions justified? No, agency frictions (adverse 
selection and lack of collateral) by themselves (i.e., without risk aversion) are highly unlikely to 
justify  developmentally-oriented  public  guarantees.  Yet,  combined  with  risk  aversion  and 
collective action failures, agency frictions can help motivate the need for public guarantees that 
harness  the  state’s  superior  ability  to  spread  idiosyncratic  risk  more  finely  than  what  is 
achievable in the market. 
 
Is  the  traditional  emphasis  on  externalities  justified?  No,  social  externalities  by 
themselves do not justify public guarantees and are best dealt with through targeted taxes and 
subsidies. Yet, a specific form of externalities—participation externalities—is a key ingredient 
underlying  the  case  for  developmentally-oriented  public  guarantees.  Such  externalities  can 
justify the state’s intervention on the same grounds that justify public goods. 
 
What  is  new  in  terms  of  traditional,  apparently  low-risk  public  guarantees?  Public 
guarantees  need  to  focus  much  more  than  what  they  generally  do  on  risk  aversion  and  the 
resulting differential costs of capital for the public and private sectors. They need to address the 
basic question of why public guarantee programs that are apparently self-sustainable are not 
being taken up by the  private sector.  Where  these programs  are really self-sustainable, they 
should be immediately divested to the private sector. When financial systems are not yet mature 
enough to take over, a clear exit strategy should be formulated. Where there are in fact hidden 
risks (fat tailed or systemic) that free markets cannot handle well, these risks and potential costs 
need to be explicitly recognized and accounted for in the public guarantee programs. 
 
  What is new in terms of expanding the risk frontier? The emphasis on risk aversion 
implies that the state’s comparative advantage should grow with the level and complexity of risk. 
Hence, the state would seem to be naturally called to play a more active developmental role by 
expanding the risk frontier and, hence, helping complete financial markets for, say, long-term 
finance, infrastructure finance, SME finance, mortgage finance for lower income households, 
and small farmers. However, much prudence is required, both to overcome public governance 19 
 
difficulties and to contain the moral hazard that generally accompanies risk-shifting to the state. 
A  cautious  approach  that  carefully  aligns  public  and  private  incentives  and  promotes  risk 
discovery through public-private arrangements seems therefore to be called for. Crucial in this 
regard is the need to price public guarantees adequately. The price of a public guarantee should 
not only cover the expected default losses, as best as they can be measured. It should also cover 
monitoring costs and, where appropriate, add a premium for the protection it provides against 
aggregate risk. 20 
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                                               Appendix I: The Mankiw Model 
 
Students  borrow  at  an  interest  rate  r  and  obtain  a  return  R.  Their  probability  of 
repayment,  p,  is  uniformly  distributed  between  P0  and  P1.  Only  the  sufficiently  dishonest 
students will ask for a loan, with the threshold such that: 
 
                                                                        (1) 
 
Hence, for an adverse selection equilibrium to prevail (where there are honest students 
who cannot borrow), the return on the loan must not be too high, such that: 
 
                                                                                 (2) 
 
The bank’s cost of funds is the risk-free rate (social cost of funds)  . The social benefit 
of education is assumed to be higher than its social cost: 
 
                                                                        (3) 
 
If the mean repayment probability is  , the bank will set the lending rate such that: 
 
                                                                        (4) 
 
Where the average probability of repayment is: 
 
                                                                         (5)
 
 
Define  as the total social value created by the loans in the market  equilibrium. It 
equals the difference between the social benefit per loan, R, and the social cost,  , times the 
number of loans: 
 
     (6) 
 
The value of the loans in the socially optimal solution where all students borrow would 
be  such that: 
 
    (7) 
 
By comparing (6) and (7), it immediately follows that  when (2) is satisfied. 
Instead,  a fully subsidized  credit  guarantee  can induce  the  risk neutral  lender  to  lend to  all 
students at the risk-free interest . Absent a requirement of revenue neutrality, the subsidized 










































However, from a broader welfare perspective that imposes revenue neutrality and where 
the distribution of tax payments across the student population matters, such a guarantee is not 
optimal. With a guarantee, everyone borrows and a share   of students (the honest 
students)  repays  the  loans.  Hence,  the  cost  of  the  guarantee  is:  .  If  the  honest 
students are the only ones who can be taxed to cover this cost, the tax per honest student will be: 
 
                                                         (8) 
 
 The honest students will only be better off paying the tax if their excess return exceeds 
the tax:  
 
                                                                           (9) 
 
Using (8) in (9) and rearranging terms leads to: 
 
                                                                    (10) 
 
But for an adverse selection equilibrium to exist, (2) needs also to be verified. In turn, 
since with (4) and (5): 
 
                                                                (11) 
 
then, with (11), (2) can be written: 
 
                                                                     (12) 
 
Putting together (10) and (12): 
 
                                                        (13) 
 
This set of inequalities cannot be verified for  ; hence it is not possible to find an 
equilibrium where there are honest students who are driven away from the market but would be 
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Appendix II. Adding risk aversion to the Calomiris-Khan model 
 
Entrepreneurs invest in projects that yield X with probability p, and 0 with probability 1-
p.  The  project  is  productive,  so  that ,  and  its  maximum  size  is  one.  If  the  project  is 
terminated early, its liquidation value is L<1; if liquidated late it is worth zero. Monitoring is 
costly and provides an imperfect signal   on the project’s failure probability, such that if 
the signal indicates failure, failure will actually occur with probability m. Thus, better monitoring 
provides a better signal. 
 
Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral but are funded by an infinite population of ex ante identical 
risk-averse investors. Ex post, however, the investor population separates into two groups. Some 
investors (―wholesalers‖) choose to invest big in the project and monitor, under the expectation 
that  monitoring  will  allow  them  to  exit  early  in  the  case  of  a  bad  project  and  recoup  their 
investment.  Other  investors  (―retailers‖)  choose  to  fully  diversify.  They  will  limit  their 
investment to an atomistic amount. Assuming projects’ probability of success is not systemically 
correlated across projects nor to investors’ income, this allows retailers to be fully diversified, 
hence to remain de facto risk-neutral. Instead, the lumpiness of wholesalers’ investment, which 
will be needed to make monitoring cost effective, will prevent them from diversifying, making 
them risk averse. 
 
Guarantors are risk-neutral financial intermediaries who purchase risk from wholesalers 
and resell it to retailers. The risk transfer takes the form of bonds whose pay off is contingent on 
the project’s failure. In keeping with the binomial structure of the model, we assume that partial 
guarantees cover uncertain full repayments (with probability  ) rather than certain partial 
repayments. Guarantees are priced fairly. Retailers can monitor the guarantor without incurring 
any cost (the monitoring pyramid already closes at this level). 
 
The possible states of the world are thus as follows: 
 
  With probability p, the project succeeds, yielding X. 
  With probability  the project fails; however, given that a correct failure signal has 
been  received,  the  project  is  terminated  early  and  yields  L;  wholesalers  get  their 
investment back and retailers get the remainder.  
  With  probability    the  project  goes  on  and  fails;  retailers  lose  their 
investment but wholesalers recoup it through the guarantee. 
  With probability   the project goes on, fails and everybody loses his 
investment (the guarantee is not activated) 
 
If  is wholesalers’ probability of getting their full return, it follows that: 
 
    (14) 
 
And the variance of the underlying binomial distribution,  , equals: 
 





















Wholesalers  and  retailers  bid  competitively  on  the  amounts  of  wholesale  and  retail 
funding, W and D respectively, which are set by the entrepreneur. For notational convenience, 
we  define    as  wholesalers’  total  stake  in  the  project,  including  interest  payments. 




Wholesalers choose the amount of monitoring m, the rate of return on wholesale funding 
, and the extent of the guarantee,  , to maximize a mean-variance utility: 
 
  (16) 
 
In  this  expression,  a  measures  the  cost  that  wholesalers’  incur  in  monitoring 
entrepreneurs,   is the degree of risk aversion, Y the premium on the guarantee, and   the 
variance of project outcomes, i.e., a measure of risk. As in any insurance contract, there is moral 
hazard.  Wholesalers  have  an  incentive  to  shirk,  which  depends  on  the  extent  to  which  the 
guarantee  internalizes  ―deviant  behavior‖.  Because  it  is  costly  for  the  guarantor  to  fully 
discriminate between wholesalers, he sets his fees partly on a collective basis and partly on an 
individual basis. Thus, while he does charge for all bad behavior collectively, he can do it only to 
a limited extent on an individual basis. Thus,  each individual wholesaler only internalizes a 
fraction   ( ) of cost of the guarantee, taking the rest,  , where   is collective 
monitoring, as given. Thus, from the individual wholesaler point of view, the premium he is 
charged is:  
 
          (17) 
 
where  b  is  the  cost  to  the  guarantor  of  monitoring  wholesalers  (i.e.,  the  recipients  of  the 
guarantee). 
 
Replacing (17) in (16): 
 
          (18) 
 
Thus, the guarantee has two impacts.  It reduces the variance of the distribution  ( ), 
hence the risk premium, which is good. But, unless there is full internalization (

1), it also 
affects m, hence undermining monitoring incentives, which is bad.  
 
Since  guarantors  are  risk  neutral  and  the  guarantee  market  is  fully  competitive, 
guarantors set  so as to minimize the premium on the guarantee, which through market arbitrage 
                                                 
26 Thus, arbitrage ensures that all retailers’ investments remain atomistic. Any retailer wishing to invest more will 
require to be compensated with a risk premium. However, since the number of retailers is very large, the atomistic 
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2     (19) 
 
Retailers also behave as if they were risk-neutral; hence they maximize:
27 
 
       (20) 
                                                     
Entrepreneurs, who are also risk neutral, maximize their expected profits: 
 
      (21) 
 
Entrepreneurs internalize the participation constraints of wholesalers and retailers when 
setting W and D. Hence,  and   can be replaced in (21) using their values extracted 
from (18) and (20), which gives: 
 
    (22) 
 
Maximizing (22) with respect to W and D is equivalent to maximizing with respect to D 
+ W (the total size of the investment) and s (the composition of the funding). In turn, as , it 
is obvious that entrepreneurs should choose the maximum size of the investment; hence: 
 
    (23) 
 
Since  risk  averse  wholesalers  and  risk  neutral  retailers  just  meet  their  participation 
constraints (they have zero excess returns), finding the guarantee that maximizes social welfare 
is equivalent to maximizing entrepreneurial profits while taking into account that guarantees are 
priced fairly (i.e., removing moral hazard). In turn, since the optimal size of the project and its 
yield are given, this amounts to minimizing entrepreneurs’ funding costs: 
   
          (24) 
 
It follows from this expression that searching for the social optimum is equivalent to 
maximizing the total size of the surplus pie, as determined by the expected liquidation proceeds 
adjusted for total monitoring costs and the deadweight cost of risk-taking. 
 





Maximizing (22) with respect to s gives: 
                                                 
27 Since the risk coverage instruments are priced fairly, they do not appear in retailers’ utility. 

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The first order condition of (18) with respect to m yields: 
 
               (26) 
 
Using (26), (25) can be rewritten as: 
 
             (27) 
 
From which:          (28) 
 
On the other hand, deriving m from the first order condition of (18): 
 
      (29) 
 
The first order condition of (19) can be written: 
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Or, using (29): 
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Or, using (31), (14) and (15), and after some algebraic manipulations: 
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Consider first the case where there is no risk aversion (

0). From (31) and (33), it can 
be readily inferred that 














































which is the socially optimal level of monitoring, as derived from (24).  This is the Calomiris-
Khan classical result. In the absence of risk aversion, wholesalers’ monitoring level is optimal. 
 
Consider  now  the  case  with  risk  aversion.  From  (31),  the  condition 

1  (full 
internalization) can be written: 
 






2]            (34) 
 
But if internalization is complete, wholesalers will always  prefer a full guarantee  to a 
partial guarantee  since the former  eliminates the risk premium term in (18)  but results in the 
same monitoring costs. At the same time, using (28) and (29), a full guarantee implies: 
 






                          (35) 
And (34) reduces to: 




2 (1 p)L                      (36) 
 
It  therefore  follows  from  (35)  that  the   full  guarantee-full  internalization  solution 
replicates the solution without risk aversion (risk is fully spread out and the market equilibrium 
is socially optimal). At the same time, given that  the direct  monitoring costs, a, should be 
sufficiently high to justify imperfect monitoring (

m1), it follows from (35) and (36) that the 
full internalization-full guarantee equilibrium should also satisfy the following conditions: 
     
                                              

b(1 p)L  a              (37)   
 
  Thus,  satisfying  (36)  and  (37)  should  ensure  a  socially  optimal,  full  guarantee 
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, (37) implies that the costs of monitoring the monitor, b, should 
be lower than the direct monitoring costs, a: There should be ―efficiency gains‖ in monitoring 





2, should be lower than the maximum possible monitoring benefit (1-p)L. 